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Abstract—RFID is a leading technology that has been rapidly
deployed in several daily life applications that require strong
security and privacy mechanisms. However, RFID systems
commonly have limited computational capacity and inefficient
data management. There is a demanding urge to address these
issues in the light of some mechanism which can make the
technology excel. Cloud computing is one of the fastest growing
segments of IT industry that provides cost effective solutions
for handling and using data collected with RFID. As more
and more information on companies and individuals is placed
in the cloud, concerns are beginning to escalate about just
how safe an environment it is. Therefore, while integrating
RFID into the cloud, the security and privacy of the tag owner
must be considered. Motivated by this, we first provide a new
security and privacy model for RFID technology integrated to
the cloud computing. In this model, we define the capabilities
of the adversary and give the formal definitions. After that
we propose a cloud-based RFID authentication protocol to
illustrate our model. The protocol utilizes symmetric-key based
cryptography. We prove that the protocol achieves destructive
privacy according to our model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology has
been around for decades. This technology has gained in-
creasing attention as an emerging solution for automatically
identifying and/or authenticating remote objects and individ-
uals. RFID based technologies have been rapidly deployed
in various daily life applications such as payment, access
control, ticketing, and e-passport that require strong security
and privacy mechanisms. Security and privacy are two major
concerns in these applications when tags are required to
provide a proof of identity. The most prominent privacy risk
is the tracking of the tag owner, which permits the creation
and abuse of circumstantial tag owner profiles. Therefore,
an RFID system should provide confidentiality of the tag
identity as well as untraceability of the tag owner even the
internal state of the tag has been disclosed [13], [17], [21].
Every potential application of RFID systems may require
a different approach. As an illustration, manufacturers or
wholesales require a full range of compliance-tagging and
verification solutions. When working to meet RFID compli-
ance mandates, today’s one foremost exigency is the need
to implement a scalable solution that not only satisfies but
also allows for future growth. Traditional RFID inventory
management solutions are expensive for large amount of
items, in the sense that they require self server maintenance
and significant IT intervention.
Moreover, for some applications multiple read points may
be required to track the products throughout workplace. In
conventional systems multiple number of databases can be
established which cause several operational problems such
that synchronization of the databases, expensive system and
difficult and separate management. To realize the benefits of
RFID, retailers will need to upgrade their IT infrastructure
in a number of areas, and their interfaces with other business
will have to be closer. The verification of tagged items by
RFID systems provides full traceability from sender (e.g.
manufacturer) to receiver by maintaining a single database
placed in a cloud computing. This provides assurance that a
product has been shipped and delivered. This is where cloud
computing may come in to provide flexibility to access to
the database and authenticate the tagged items/persons. A
cloud system can be simply thought of as a server farm that
has great computational and storage capacity maintained by
the some other operators. In fact, this can greatly reduce
the start-up costs as well as the drain that can be put on
the IT staff for the RFID system maintainer. Thanks to
cloud computing, retailers will not need to upgrade their
IT infrastructure.
An RFID system using cloud service as a back-end
database and computational capacity is strongly relevant
when there is multiple facility providers (such as library,
sport center, museum etc.) which are connected to a exec-
utive enterprise. In addition, centralizing the above RFID
applications and integrating them with an executive systems
will require a new level of systems integration capabilities.
Using a unified cloud database empowers a single authenti-
cation system to more effectively manage pricing, events,
reduces inventory losses, expands service offerings, and
provides entire RFID infrastructures using a single system.
The cloud paradigm provides the ability to offer a single
card to each user to get service from multiple applications.
Besides the usability and reachability of cloud computing,
the main question is to understand and manage the pub-
lic concern such as the confidentiality and privacy issues.
Therefore some skeptic questions may arise. Can we provide
the confidentiality and privacy of the user’s data in the
public cloud domain? Can we maintain an authentication
mechanism by using a far distant cloud service like in our
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private database?
In RFID literature, some protocols require exhaustive
search on private identity [3], [18] or asymmetric calcu-
lation [5], [21] in order to have a strong authentication
mechanism. For large systems, these strong private protocols
may result in the need of heavy and expensive servers
that have fast computational capacity or large storage. Also
some efficient authentication mechanisms may have several
security flows (for security analysis of such protocols we
refer to [2].)
Motivated from the innovations offered by cloud com-
puting, the primary focus of this paper is to propose a
security and privacy model for the existing RFID systems
melded with the cloud computing paradigm in order to
improve the scalability, boost the performance and maintain
the security & privacy of whole systems. We first define
the system procedures for our new model. Contrary to the
previous models [1], [10], [12], [13], [20], [22], we have
an additional oracle that an adversary can query the cloud
system. Then, the adversary classes are described and we
give our security and privacy definitions. Moreover, the
readers do not store tag related information but the cloud
does. Finally, in order to illustrate our model, we propose
an RFID authentication protocol as case study. We prove that
the proposal is destructive private according to our model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce our novel privacy model that includes system
procedures, adversary oracles and adversary capabilities. We
describe the security and privacy definitions with respect to
the adversary classes. In Section 3, we propose a privacy
preserving RFID authentication protocol which is integrated
into a cloud computing service and analyze security and
privacy according to our privacy model. Finally, we conclude
the paper with a brief discussion in Section 4.
II. OUR PRIVACY MODEL
Our privacy model borrows and extends the concepts from
previous models [12], [22]. In our model, an RFID system
consists of a cloud service, many tags, multiple readers
where a tag and a reader carry out an authentication protocol
by the help of the cloud service. Each tag stores a state, the
cloud keeps a database of all tags. Namely, the cloud is the
central back-end server. The readers authenticate the tags
by the help of the cloud. Adversaries are allowed to interact
with all tags and readers and the cloud. Our model is similar
to the classical RFID models, which consider many tags,
many readers and a back-end server. The main difference
between our model and the classical models is that in our
model the security and privacy between readers and the
server are also considered. The privacy of the tag owners
against the server, which is placed in a cloud, is also taken
into account. Moreover, the tag related information such as
tag owner’s information, are stored only in the database
of the cloud but not in the reader. Our model does not
consider the physical characteristics of the radio links as
studied by Danev et al. [9]. Regarding the security of the
exchanged messages, our model only considers the content
of the messages but not the physical properties.
In this section, we first present the system procedures and
the oracles that an adversary can query. Then, the adversary
classes are described. Finally, we define our security and
privacy definitions.
A. System Procedure
Throughout the paper we modify the common model for
RFID systems and use the similar definitions introduced
in [8], [22]. An RFID scheme is defined with the following
procedures.
• SETUPCLOUD(1) : This algorithm generates a public-
private key pair (KCP ,KCS ) for cloud where  is the
security parameter and initializes its database DB.
• SETUPREADER(1) : This algorithm generates a public-
private key pair (KRP ,KRS ) for reader where  is the
security parameter and stores its secrets in its non-
volatile memory.
• SETUPTAGKP (ID): This algorithm generates a tag se-
cret K and the tag identifier ID. If this tag is legitimate,
the pair (ID,K) is inserted into the database.
• IDENT: An interaction protocol between a tag and a
reader to complete the authentication transcript.
B. Adversary Oracles
Privacy is defined as a distinguish-ability game (or exper-
iment Exp) between a challenger and an adversary. This
game is defined as follows. The challenger first picks a
random challenge bit b and then sets up the system with
a security parameter k. Next, the adversary A is allowed to
interact with the system by the help of following generic
oracles. First of all, A creates a new tag of identifier IDT .
Then, A interacts with following two collections of oracles.
Definition 1: (Adversary Oracles-I)
• CREATETAG(IDT ) : It creates a free tag T with a
unique identifier IDT by using SetupTagKCP . It also
inserts T into DB.
• LAUNCH()→ π : It makes the reader R start a new
Ident protocol transcript π.
• SENDREADER(m,π)→ m′: This sends the message m
to the reader R in the protocol transcript π and outputs
the response m′.
• SENDCLOUD(m,π)→ m′: This sends the message m
to the cloud C in the protocol transcript π and outputs
the response m′.
• SENDTAG(m, vtag)b → m′: on input vtag, this oracle
retrieves the triple (vtag, Ti, Tj) from the table D and
sends the message m to either Ti (if b = 0) or Tj (if
b = 1). It returns the reply from the tag (m′). If the
above triple is not found in D, it returns ⊥.
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Table I
THE ADVERSARY CLASSES
Strong ⇒ Destructive ⇒ Weak Active Insider
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Narrow Strong ⇒ Narrow Destructive ⇒ Narrow Weak Passive Insider
• DRAWTAGb(Ti, Tj) → vtag: on input a pair of tag
references, this oracle generates a virtual tag reference,
as a monotonic counter, vtag and stores the triple
(vtag, Ti, Tj) in a table D. Depending on the value
of b, vtag either refers to Ti or Tj . If Ti is already
references as the left-side tag in D or Tj as the right-
side tag, then this oracle also returns ⊥ and adds no
entry to D. Otherwise, it returns vtag.
• FREE(vtag)b : on input vtag, this oracle retrieves the
triple (vtag, Ti, Tj) from the table D. If b = 0, it resets
the tag Ti. Otherwise, it resets the tag Tj . Then it
removes the entry (vtag, Ti, Tj) from D. When a tag
is reset, its volatile memory is erased. The non-volatile
memory, which contains the state S, is preserved.
• CORRUPT(Ti)→ S : It returns volatile and non-volatile
memory of the tag Ti.
• RESULT(π)→ x : When π completes, returns x = 1 if
the tag is identified, returns x = 0 otherwise.
In our model, we also define two another oracles as follows.
Definition 2: (Adversary Oracles-II)
• CORRUPT(Ri)→ S : It returns volatile and non-volatile
memory of the reader Ri.
• CORRUPT(Cloud)→ S : It returns volatile and non-
volatile memory of the cloud.
Definition 3: (ExpS,A()) By using the DRAWTAG oracle
the adversary can arbitrarily select the tags to interact
with. According to the challenge bit b, the system that the
challenger presents to the adversary will behave as either the
left tags Ti or the right tags Tj . After A called the oracles,
it outputs a guess bit g. The outcome of the game will be
g
?
= b, i.e., 0 for an incorrect and 1 for a correct guess.
The adversary wins the privacy game if it can distinguish
correctly the left from the right world being executed.
The advantage of the adversary AdvS,A(k) is defined as:
∣∣Pr
[
Exp0S,A(k) = 1
]
+ Pr
[
Exp1S,A(k) = 1
]− 1∣∣ .
C. Privacy Classes
Contrary to previous models, our model classify the
adversaries as either insider adversary or outsider adversary.
The cloud is expected to be the insider adversary who runs
the protocol between a legitimate reader and itself correctly,
but might save the messages to distinguish the tags. Namely,
the cloud is honest but curious during its protocol runs.
However, for the outsider adversaries, similar to Vaudenay
privacy class [22], we introduce four privacy classes of
polynomial-time bounded adversaries, determined by A’s
access to RESULT or CORRUPT oracles. These classes are
formally defined as follows.
Definition 4: (Adversary Classes) An adversary A is a
p.p.t. algorithm which has arbitrary number of accesses to
either the oracles described in Definition 1 or the oracles
described in Definition 2.
• Insider A cannot access to any oracles except COR-
RUPT(Cloud) oracle described in Definition 2.
• Weak A uses only the oracles given in Definition 1
except CORRUPT(Ti) oracle.
• Destructive A uses only the oracles given in Defini-
tion 1 but cannot use any oracle on a tag after using
CORRUPT(Ti).
• Strong A uses only the oracles given in Definition 1
without any restrictions.
• Narrow A has no access to RESULT oracle.
• Wide: A has access to RESULT oracle.
Remark 1: In a real-life system, Insider adversary makes
sense when the RFID system owner would like to outsource
his/her services to a cloud. In this case, the cloud owner is
able to access all the data stored in the cloud and can analyze
any interactions with his/her cloud services. Therefore, the
system owner may want his/her system to be secure against
this attack.
According to the capability of the attacker Insider adver-
sary could be two types: passive and active.
Definition 5: (Passive Insider Adversary) A passive In-
sider adversary is one who follows the protocol and does
not modify any data but is curious to get some information
and may keep all the data and its intermediate computations.
In case the adversary is the cloud owner then one may call
the cloud owner as semi-honest party.
Definition 6: (Active Insider Adversary) An active In-
sider adversary is one who covers the passive adversary and
can actively modify the local data or internal computations.
In case the adversary is the cloud owner then one may call
the cloud owner as malicious party.
We also define X+ and X∗ privacy notion variants, where
X refers to the basic privacy notion. + refers to the notion
that arises when the adversary has also access to COR-
RUPT(R) oracle. But ∗ refers to the notion that arises when
the capabilities of the adversary are further restricted with
respect to CORRUPT oracle. The restricted CORRUPT oracle
will only return the non-volatile state of the corrupted party
(tag, reader or the cloud) but not the volatile memory state.
With this restriction, we exclude trivial privacy attacks on
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Tag NFC Cloud DB
Gi,MSi, ctri, IDi, gi SR, IDR, ctr S, ctr
a ∈R {0, 1}α
If ctri > ctr
a,ctr,IDR←−−−−−−−−−−−−− Secure Channel
Then return⊥. SR,IDR,ctr←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
b ∈R {0, 1}α
S ← Pi(Gi)⊕MSi
Kg ← H(H(S, IDR, ctr), gi)
m1 ← H(Kg, a, b, 1)
m2 ← H(Kg, a, b, 2)⊕ IDi
m3 ← H(Kg, IDi, a, b, 1)
delete S
m1,m2,m3,b−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If ∃(SR, g) s.t
K′g ← H(SR, g) and
m1
?
= H(K′g, a, b, 1) then
ID′i ← H(K′g, a, b, 2)⊕m2
If H(K′g, ID′i, a, b, 1) 
= m3
return random
If m4
?
= H(Kg, IDi, a, b, 2) and ctri > ctr m4←−−−−−−−−−−− else return m4 ← H(K′g, ID′i, a, b, 2)
then ctri ← ctr, delete Kg
Figure 1. A Destructive Private Authentication Protocol+∗.
multi-pass protocols in which the tags are required to store
some information in volatile memory during the session of
the protocols.
D. Notion of Security and Privacy
Definition 7: (Correctness) An RFID scheme is correct if
the identification of a legitimate tag only fails with negligible
probability with respect to system’s security parameter.
Definition 8: (Tag Authentication) An RFID system
achieves tag authentication if for every strong adversary and
for every tag in the system, the probability of attacker’s
impersonating any tag is at most negligible. The adversary
may interact with the tag they want to impersonate. The
adversary can corrupt all tags but not the impersonated tag.
Definition 9: (Privacy [12]). A privacy preserving proto-
col, modeled by an RFID system S, is said to computation-
ally provide privacy notion X, provided that for all polyno-
mially bounded adversaries A, it holds that AdvXS,A(k) ≤ ,
for negligible .
III. CASE STUDY
A. Preliminaries and Notations
The protocol is based on low-cost symmetric primitives
such as physically unclonable functions and hash functions.
The function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}α is a cryptographic hash
function, which is treated as random oracle. Namely, the
function H responds to every query with a truly random re-
sponse chosen uniformly from {0, 1}α. The function always
gives the same response for a given input word.
Moreover, we also use physically unclonable functions
(PUF) that are defined as a disordered physical structure
implementing a unique function that maps challenges to
responses. The responses depend on the nano-scale structural
disorder of the PUF, which is assumed to be unclonable
or not even reproducible by the PUF’s manufacturer. There
several types of PUF functions such as optical, coating,
delay, SRAM, and etc. [15], [19]. However, in this protocol,
we utilize the coating PUF function which is modeled by
[16]. The PUF function, which is used in the protocol, is
defined as P : {0, 1}α → {0, 1}α where α is the security
parameter. The further properties of the PUF function are
presented in [14].
B. The Proposal
Let I be a trusted issuer who sets up the system param-
eters and the secrets of each party. I first selects a random
master secret S ∈R {0, 1}α and creates an counter ctr,
which is initially set to zero. The cloud stores the master
secret S and the counter ctr. Integration of a reader into
system is very simple by just sending a triple (IDR, SR =
H(S, IDR, ctr), ctr) to the reader via a secure channel. I
defines a group size (say l) and creates a counter g which
specifies the order of the group a tag belongs to. During
the registration of a tag Ti, I first selects a random unique
IDi ∈R {0, 1}α, and a random challenge Gi and computes
the masked master secret MSi ← S ⊕Pi(Gi) and specifies
the order of the tag gi and set its counter ctri ← 0. T stores
the values (MSi, IDi, Gi, gi, ctri).
The protocol steps are depicted in Figure 2. When a reader
(e.g. NFC) R is connected to the cloud, the cloud sends
a triple SR ← H(S, IDR, ctr), IDR ∈R {0, 1}α and ctr
to the reader via secure channel. When a tag T comes in
the range of the reader, the reader first chooses a random
number a ∈R {0, 1}α and sends the triple (a, IDR, ctr) to
T . Then, T first checks whether ctr is greater or equal to
its counter ctri. If ctr < ctri, T aborts the protocol. T also
chooses another random number b ∈R {0, }α, evaluates the
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PUF Pi with Gi and XOR it with MSi to recover master
key S ← Pi(Gi) ⊕ MSi. Then, T computes the session
secret Kg ← H(H(S, IDR, ctr), gi). Then, T computes
m1 ← H(Kg, a, b, 1), m2 ← H(Kg, a, b, 2) ⊕ IDi,m3 ←
H(Kg, IDi, a, b, 1) and sends (b,m1,m2,m3) to the reader.
T deletes S from memory. After that, for all possible value
of g, R computes m′1 ← H(H(SR, g), a, b, 1) to find a
match m′1
?
= m1. If a match is found, then R derives
ID′i ← H(H(SR, g), a, b, 2) ⊕m2. T also checks whether
the integrity of ID′i is protected by simple checking the
equality of m3
?
= H(K ′g, ID′i, a, b, 1). Now, If every steps
are on the right line, R authenticates the T . R finally
calculates m4 ← H(K ′g, ID′i, a, b, 2) and sends it to T . T
checks whether both conditions are hold ctr > ctri and
H(Kg, IDi, a, b, 2) ?= m4. If these conditions are hold, then
T updates its counter ctri ← ctr. Finally, T deletes Kg
from the memory.
After the reader authenticating the tag, the reader will run
a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol with the cloud
in order to get the tag related information such as tag owner’s
photo, birth-date and etc. PIR protocols allow a user to get
a data item from a database while hiding the identity of the
item being retrieved. In the protocol, the reader simply use
IDi for its query but the cloud will not be aware of it. PIR
is out of our scope, so for further details we refer to [4],
[6], [7], [11].
Remark 2: Note that whenever a strong adversary tries
to apply a physical attack on a target tag, she cannot reach
either the valid secret Kg or the valid master secret S.
In order to achieve a micro-probing attack on the tag, she
should first make a hole on the coating by using Focused Ion
Beam. In this case, the structure of the PUF most probably
gets a damage that the response of the PUF would be very
high level noisy and the PUF control will detect such level
of noise and destroys the PUF. The response will not be
valid and the master secret S and the session key Kg will
not be computed correctly.
C. The Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we provide the security and privacy
analysis of the protocol depicted at Figure 1.
Remark 3: Throughout this section, one can assume that
there is one reader and many tags in the system. There
is no loss in the generality with this assumption. To see
that, for fixed a and b values, different NR values produce
different Kg values. However, all these Kg values have
same randomness (they are indifferent) in the view of the
adversary. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish whether
only one or more readers are used in the system. Hence, one
NFC is enough for the analysis. Moreover, we use a slightly
enhanced version of CREATETAG oracle in the proof of the
privacy by adding extra parameter to the function which
specifies the group of the tag.
Theorem 1: The proposed protocol satisfies tag authenti-
cation against destructive adversary.
Proof: The proof is pretty trivial. Note that the adver-
sary cannot get the values of either Kg or S regardless of
how many tags she is allowed to use or corrupt. Moreover,
by definition 8. the adversary is not allowed to corrupt the
target tag. It is a so low probability that the adversary get
the ID of the target tag. Even if this event is realized, the
adversary’s producing correct m3 value is at most negligible
since reader sends the challenge values a randomly. Thus,
the system satisfies tag authentication.
Theorem 2: The proposed protocol satisfies destructive
privacy.
Proof: The only way for adversary to destroy the
privacy is to choose right tags from the same group
and left tags from different groups and to expect hav-
ing the same response to a specified challenge value.
First of all, the adversary creates two tags by calling
T1 =CREATETAG(ID1, 0) and T2 =CREATETAG(ID1, 1)
oracles. Then she applies vtag1 =DRAWTAG(T1, T2) and
uses SENDTAG(a, ctr, IDR, vtag1) for l times and stores
the answers mi11 ,m
i
21 ,m
i
31 , b
i
1 where i ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
Similarly, the adversary creates another two tags by calling
T3 =CREATETAG(ID3, 0) and T4 =CREATETAG(ID4, 2)
oracles. Then she applies vtag2 =DRAWTAG(T3, T4) and
uses SENDTAG(a, ctr, IDR, vtag2) for k times and stores
the answer of the mj12 ,m
j
22 ,m
j
32 , b
j
2 where j ∈
{1, . . . , k}. If bi01 = bj02 for some i0 and j0 but mi011 
=
mj021 then the answer is the right tags. Otherwise the answer
is the left tags. The probability of having wrong result after
these observations is negligible. Note that the adversary does
not need to create more tags as described above since having
more protocol runs with these two tag groups has the same
effect of creating new tags and having protocol rounds for
the adversary. Therefore, with given parameters the success
probability of the adversary is
1−
k−1∏
i=0
(1− l
2α − i ).
Let P =
∏k−1
i=0 (1− l2α−i ), then
ln(P ) =
k−1∑
i=0
ln(1− l
2α − i ) ≈ −
k−1∑
i=0
l
2α − i >
(k − 1)l
2α
.
So,
1− P < 1− e (k−1)l2α .
Note that, the probability above is negligible as k, l are
polynomially bounded in α. Thus, the proposed protocol
satisfies destructive privacy.
Theorem 3: The proposed protocol is resistant against
passive insider adversary according to Definition 5.
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The correctness of the last theorem is obvious as the cloud
does not even know whether NFC has a protocol transaction
with any tag at a specified time. In this protocol, the role
of the cloud is just initialize the reader for ctr and IDR
values.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we provide a new security and privacy model
for RFID technology, which is integrated into cloud service
to leverage the availability and scalability of the system. In
this model, we first define the capabilities of the adversary
and then give the definitions of the security and privacy.
After that we give an example of RFID authentication
protocol. Using our privacy model we analyze the sample
protocol and proved that the proposal is destructive private.
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